Social Jealousy and Stigma: Negative Externalities of Social Assistance Payments in Germany by Sonja C. Kassenboehmer & John P. Haisken-DeNew
Sonja C. Kassenboehmer 


























Ruhr-Universität Bochum (RUB), Department of Economics
Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Vogelpothsweg 87, 44227 Dortmund, Germany
Universität Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
Universitätsstraße 12, 45117 Essen, Germany
Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Hohenzollernstr. 1/3, 45128 Essen, Germany
Editors:
Prof. Dr. Thomas K. Bauer
RUB, Department of Economics
Empirical Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 234/3 22 83 41, e-mail: thomas.bauer@rub.de
Prof. Dr. Wolfgang Leininger
Technische Universität Dortmund, Department of Economic and Social Sciences
Economics – Microeconomics
Phone: +49 (0) 231 /7 55-32 97, email: W.Leininger@wiso.uni-dortmund.de
Prof. Dr. Volker Clausen
University of Duisburg-Essen, Department of Economics
International Economics
Phone: +49 (0) 201/1 83-36 55, e-mail: vclausen@vwl.uni-due.de
Prof. Dr. Christoph M. Schmidt
RWI
Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-227, e-mail: christoph.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Editorial Office:
Joachim Schmidt
RWI, Phone: +49 (0) 201/81 49-292, e-mail: joachim.schmidt@rwi-essen.de
Ruhr Economic Papers #117
Responsible Editor:Wolfgang Leininger
All rights reserved.Bochum,Dortmund,Duisburg,Essen,Germany,2009
ISSN 1864-4872 (online) – ISBN 978-3-86788-130-2
The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to
stimulate discussion and critical comments.Views expressed represent exclusively
the authors’own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editors.Ruhr Economic Papers
#117




of Social Assistance Payments
in GermanyBibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek
Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in
der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie;detaillierte bibliografische Daten
sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar.
ISSN 1864-4872 (online)
ISBN 978-3-86788-130-2Social Jealousy and Stigma: Negative
Externalities of Social Assistance Payments
in Germany
Sonja C. Kassenboehmer
(RWI Essen and University of Bochum)
John P. Haisken-DeNew
(University of Bochum, RWI Essen, McMaster University) 1
June 2009
Abstract: This paper examines the role of social assistance payments (SAP or Sozialhilfe) in deter-
mining levels of life satisfaction in Germany using the SOEP 1995-2004. We ﬁnd strong evidence
that individuals in Germany are negatively inﬂuenced by increased SAP payments controlling for
income, whether or not they actually receive such payments (stigma and social jealousy). While
there are obvious beneﬁts to making SAP to those needy, there are substantial negative externali-
ties experienced by those who neither receive SAP nor qualify (counterfactual SAP). Furthermore,
these negative eﬀects are even stronger for those who do receive beneﬁts (stigma) suggesting that
social jealousy and stigma are a force to be reckoned with when evaluating social policy. We show
that the added beneﬁts of increasing SAP are reduced by 50 to 100% because of social jealousy
and stigma costs, whereas child beneﬁts (Kindergeld) are seen to enhance life satisfaction over and
above a simple income eﬀect. Further, own-earned income, over and above the SAP subsistence
level is valued much higher than transfer payments at the SAP subsistence level, suggesting a
policy focus on increasing employment integration eﬀorts for SAP recipients as opposed merely to
providing SAP transfers.
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1 Introduction
Social assistance payments (SAP) or "welfare beneﬁts" seems to be a double-edged
sword. Those who receive SAP only do so, as they are otherwise unable to provide
for themselves, either through long-term unemployment, inability to accumulate
work-related entitlements or some sort of health disability etc. However, at the
same time, for the marginal potential SAP recipient, incentives to work are also
negatively aﬀected. In some constellations (in Europe, especially when the main
earner is not well educated and many children are present in the household), the
diﬀerence between full time wages from employment and SAP receipt (Lohnabstand)
is minimal (ISG, 2006) reducing incentives for work. Furthermore, there have been
discussions in the public and the press about the absolute level of minimum exis-
tence, triggered by a controversial study that showed that as little as ¤1322 but no
more than ¤278 per month (excluding rent, heat and electricity payments) would
be suﬃcient instead of the ¤347 that one would currently receive as a healthy sin-
gle male SAP recipient (Thiessen and Fischer, 2008). They speciﬁcally cited that
expenditure patterns for food, household items and clothing were very similar to
that of the general population and in no way represented a minimum existence, but
rather an average existence.
While this study has speciﬁcally looked at the needs of (male) adults and there-
fore has triggered a discussion on their needs, another discussion on the level of
payments to children for unemployed people receiving Hartz IV (since 2005 unem-
ployment assistance and social assistance for employable people have been combined
to Arbeitslosengeld II on a level eﬀectively similar to the level of the former SAP -
the former standard rate of SAP had been lower than Arbeitslosengeld II but had
the possibility of one-oﬀ payments for special needs) has been risen since the Federal
Social Court (Bundessozialgericht) has found these payments to be unconstitutional
on January 27, 2009. Setting the payments for all children between age 0 and 14 to
60% (¤211) of the standard rate of adults (¤351) would violate the constitutional
principle of equality (Gleichheitsgrundsatz), because contrary to the determination
2It should be remembered that at the time of the study (2008), the German state paid between
¤154 and ¤179 per child and month in the form of child beneﬁts (Kindergeld). Thus, suggesting
that an adult could subsist on ¤132 is clearly a low estimate in the literature.3
of the standard rate for adults, the court found that the needs for children had
not been explicitly deﬁned and determined. Furthermore, the fact that the level of
payments is the same for all children between the ages 0 to 14 would ignore diﬀering
needs for children of diﬀerent ages.3
These two controversial discussions reﬂect that (i) there is still no public consensus
as to the actual level of a socially acceptable minimum existence, (ii) there might be
incentives not to work for certain groups of people at given levels of social transfer
payments and (iii) payments to diﬀerent groups of needy persons (adults vs. chil-
dren) might be aﬄicted with diﬀerent levels of stigma and social jealousy which we
will employ to show the robustness of our results. Given that the state or in the
end the tax payer has to pay for these transfers, the general question arises how
these transfers are actually valued by the people, ﬁrst of all, obviously by those
who receive the payments and second, by those who ﬁnance them. Answering these
questions is not straightforward because for SAP recipients, the payments lead on
the one hand to securing their living, but on the other hand, these people are also
aﬄicted with stigma costs4 which is often forgotten in the debate. For the second
group of people, the non-takers, SAP may be soothing comfort in uncertain times,
but also worrying because someone, namely those working, has to ﬁnance the SAP
system in the end.
Hence this paper tries to examine SAP from a diﬀerent angle in that it explicitly
tries to gain insight as to how diﬀerent kinds of people actually value these payments.
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of SAP in determining an indicator of
general wellbeing, namely life satisfaction. How do people in Germany value trans-
fers as a form of income? Is one Euro of money transferred equivalent to one Euro
earned? How are people aﬀected in their life satisfaction by transfer recipients in
their area? Do transfer recipients value the income they receive in form of transfers?
Are those who do not receive transfers negatively or positively aﬀected by the out-
side option of receiving transfers? In other words, we can gain some insights as to
3http://www.zeit.de/online/2009/05/hartz-kinder-bundessozialgericht
4"Stigma" and "social jealousy" are two sides of the same coin. "Stigma" is felt by those who
receive SAP (takers) and "social jealousy" by those who ﬁnance SAP (non takers).4
the preferences for more or less spending on the social state and quantify the poten-
tial social jealousy felt by non-transfer recipients towards the receivers of transfers
and potential externality losses (i.e. stigma or shame) experienced by the recipients.
Our analysis will focus on SAP as opposed to unemployment insurance or other
beneﬁts because SAP are the long-term minimum security payments someone re-
ceives, who is not able to provide for his own subsistence. Hence looking at SAP
recipients ﬁrst of all allows us to look at those who are really in need but also allows
us to compare data for a long time period because SAP in Germany date back to
the Social Assistance Act of 1962 (Bundessozialhilfegesetz, BSGH) and have been
implemented since then.
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is the longest
running household panel study in Europe (see Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2005; Wag-
ner, Burkhauser, and Bheringer, 1993 for more information concerning the SOEP).
According to the administrative rules for determining levels of SAP, we calculate
a potential or counterfactual SAP entitlement for every household over the period
1995-2004, regardless of whether these persons actually receive SAP. This "outside
option" SAP is very well deﬁned (almost deterministically), varies by federal state,
year, and household composition (numbers and ages of household members present).
Since 1962 there have been many exogenous changes in the SAP structure over time
as well as between federal states. We examine the role of the potential SAP in
determining the utility that is gained from it by takers and non-takers which we ap-
proximate using questions regarding subjective self-evaluated life satisfaction which
builds on a strand of literature that has recently become very popular and well-
acknowledged in welfare economics. To illustrate the robustness of the results, we
additionally control for a common non-stigmatizing transfer, namely child beneﬁts
(Kindergeld) and demonstrate that while SAP remains negative and signiﬁcant for
life satisfaction, child beneﬁts transfers for households with children are seen to be
positive and signiﬁcant.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides background information
on the literature with respect to subjective wellbeing, SAP and child beneﬁt receipt.5
Section 3 describes the data used and the econometric analysis and discussion. Sec-
tion 4 draws conclusions.
2 Backround
Previous studies have tried to investigate why there seems to be a high non-take up
behaviour in Germany and have attributed this at least partly to stigma eﬀects5.
Similar to Riphahn (2001) who uses EVS data6, Frick and Groh-Samberg (2007)
using SOEP data for example, regress SAP take-up on several proxies for utility
derived from SAP7(in the sense of "degree of needs" and "duration of needs") and
proxies for claiming costs. They assert that education, gender, migration status and
level of urbanisation are proxies for claiming costs8. In this sense, they postulate for
example that social norms for males are diﬀerent than for females which should be
reﬂected in higher non-take up rates for males if stigma plays a role. The estimated
coeﬃcients for the needs proxies perform as expected: the coeﬃcients are in general
positive indicating that higher need result in higher take-up rates. Controlling for
selection results in negative (signiﬁcant) coeﬃcients for low education and living in
a rural area indicating that stigma might play a role in explaining the puzzle of high
non-take up rates.
There are also other international studies trying to explain take-up behaviour mainly
in the UK and USA. While there are several theoretical papers (such as Yaniv, 1997),
other papers present empirical tests of their theoretical models (such as Moﬃtt, 1983
and Blundell, Fry, and Walker, 1988). All of these papers argue that stigma might
play a signiﬁcant role in take-up behaviour. While these international studies try to
explain international take-up behaviour, many of the German studies examine the
5Frick and Groh-Samberg (2007) argue that a substantial portion of non-take up behaviour can
be explained by "rational poverty", meaning that for households who are just below the eligibility
threshold, the costs of claiming often exceed the utility from claiming.
6A federal consumer expenditure survey.
7Families with children are assumed to have a higher utility because of the responsibility of
providing good care for the children.
8Other characteristics that are used for proxies are household structure (single parents, families
or pensioner household), region (East or West Germany), attitudes towards social security and
degree of regional concentration of SAP recipients.6
topic only in a descriptive manner (for an overview see Riphahn, 2001).
The advantage of our study is that we do not have to derive potential stigma eﬀects
from the impacts of certain characteristics (which might or might not be related to
stigma) on take-up behaviour because the presence of questions on individual life
satisfaction in the SOEP data allows us to investigate the direct impact of SAP
payments on people’s well-being, regardless of take-up or non-take up, using ﬁxed
eﬀects regression and controlling for an extensive set of relevant characteristics. Our
model allows us to address several interesting questions: We can not only investigate
how SAP payments are actually valued by the people, but also if one Euro earned
is valued the same as one Euro transferred and how those are eﬀected who do not
receive payments.
The literature that uses life satisfaction questions to approximate individual well-
being has grown in recent years and has become very well acknowledged in economic
research. Researchers usually use responses to questions based on an ordinal scale
(ranging, for example from 0 to 10 as in the German SOEP), asking for a person’s
own evaluation of his/her life satisfaction level. The given life satisfaction level
is seen to reﬂect circumstances, aspirations, comparisons with others, one’s own
baseline of happiness, past experiences and dispositional outlook (Frey and Stutzer,
2002; Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2004). There has been a high level of empirical
support (not only by applied economists, but also by psychologists, especially in
the early stages of this strand of literature) for the validity of these life satisfaction
questions as measuring utility which has made the economic concept of happiness
so popular, notwithstanding the critique of Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001). The
potential for new insights of this research has been demonstrated by a large empir-
ical literature (for income eﬀects of wellbeing see Clark, Frijters, and Shields, 2006;
Frijters, Haisken-DeNew, and Shields, 2004a,b and for unemployment Winkelmann
and Winkelmann, 1998, Clark and Oswald, 1994 and Kassenboehmer and Haisken-
DeNew, 2009).
Here we use this line of research by investigating the eﬀect of SAP payments on
well-being, using life satisfaction as a measure for well-being, which has not been7
done before in connection with SAP. This allows us to gain new insights about the
value of SAP payments but also about potential negative externalities.
Until 2004 in Germany, short-term unemployed persons received unemployment in-
surance (Arbeitslosengeld later to be called Arbeitslosengeld I), whereas long-term
unemployed persons could only receive unemployment assistance payments (Arbeit-
slosenhilfe) at a substantially lower rate. Even lower were the payments made to
those receiving SAP, i.e. those not having worked long enough or never having
worked to be entitled to employment related beneﬁts. Since 2005, those employ-
able persons previously having received unemployment assistance have been put at
the same levels of payments of those receiving SAP. Accordingly those previously
receiving unemployment assistance and currently able-bodied, receive "Arbeitslosen-
geld II" or "Hartz IV" at eﬀectively the same rate as those who are not able-bodied
(not able to work due to some impairment), i.e. the SAP recipients (the former
standard rate of SAP had been lower than Arbeitslosengeld II but had the possibil-
ity of one-oﬀ payments for special needs).
Figure 1 shows the increase in the rates of social assistance payments recipients
with the federal state of Hamburg having the highest rates and Bavaria having the
lowest rates. Similar to the rising rate of recipients, did the expenditures on SAP
rise as can bee seen in Frick and Groh-Samberg (2007). Because the number of
people receiving SAP increased, due to the prevalence of mass (long-term) unem-
ployment, the state made several attempts to reduce the number in the 1990s. These
included sanctions for rejections of reasonable job oﬀers Adamy and Steﬀen (1998),
workfare programs and not raising the basic rates in line with the increasing living
standards Frick and Groh-Samberg (2007); Hauser and Hübinger (1993).The federal
government also tried to exclude certain groups of people from claiming beneﬁts,
such as asylum seekers in 1993 Adamy and Steﬀen (1998); Frick and Groh-Samberg
(2007). Furthermore, the composition of the SAP recipients changed: while the
share of elderly claiming beneﬁts declined, the number for households with children
increased as well as the share of single-parent households and foreigners (see Hauser
and Hübinger, 1993 and Frick and Groh-Samberg, 2007).
Now we brieﬂy examine child beneﬁts (Kindergeld) as another kind of social transfer,8
but with substantially less stigma attached as compared to SAP. It will be useful to
compare the externality eﬀects on life satisfaction of SAP while controlling for child
beneﬁts. Since 1980, there have been several exogenous changes made to the struc-
ture of child beneﬁts in Germany. Beneﬁts are non-linear and depend on whether
the family consists of 1, 2, 3, or 4 and more children. Child beneﬁt payment changes
occurred in 1982, 1991, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2000, and 2002. In 1996, the regular max-
imum age of beneﬁt receipt was raised from 16 to 18 years of age. Beneﬁts were also
allowed if the child was older than 16, unemployed and looking for work until the
age of 18. This was later extended to 18-21 in 1996. Potentially, parents of a child
in full time post-secondary learning could receive beneﬁts until the child turned 27.
This was later scaled back to 26 and 25 depending on birth year in 2007. In 1980,
approximately ¤25 was paid for the ﬁrst child, ¤39 for the second, ¤75 for the
third and over whereas in 2004, ¤154 was paid for each of the ﬁrst three children
and ¤179 for the fourth or more. For more information on child beneﬁts and their
impacts, see Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000), Fertig, Tamm, and
Corak (2005), Haan and Wrohlich (2007), Kornstad and Thoresen (2004). In our
analysis, we will oﬀer evidence for the robustness of our results in that we compare
the eﬀects of child beneﬁt payments to the eﬀects of simple SAP transfers.
3 Empirical Application
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), the longest running
European household panel. Started in 1984 it examined persons in German and
non-German households in West Germany. It expanded in 1990 to include the for-
mer East Germany. Since then there have been several expansions of the data set,
such that in 2000 the data set was eﬀectively doubled. See Haisken-DeNew and
Frick (2005) and Wagner, Burkhauser, and Bheringer (1993) for more information9.
9The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz v2.0 (Sep
2007) for Stata. PanelWhiz was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-DeNew (john@panelwhiz.eu).
The following authors supplied PanelWhiz SOEP Plugins used to ensure longitudinal consistency,
John P. Haisken-DeNew (29), Markus Hahn and John P. Haisken-DeNew (18). The PanelWhiz
generated DO ﬁle to retrieve the SOEP data used here and any Panelwhiz Plugins are available
upon request. Any data or computational errors in this paper are my own. Haisken-DeNew and9
The SOEP asks respondents to give on a 0 (low) to 10 (high) scale the level of
their life satisfaction or general wellbeing. The question is particularly good, as it
is always asked at the end of the survey and this repeatedly over all years. It also
has consistently a particularly low item non-response. Following Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters (2004) we will ultimately use ﬁxed eﬀects panel regression (linear and
binary logit) without substantial loss of ordinal interpretability (allowing us to avoid
using the conditional ordered logit model as in Chamberlain (1980) to estimate the
following life satisfaction (LS) regression:
LSit = a0 + ai +
b ¤ (Standard Control Variables Xit) +
c ¤ (Net HH Incomeht) +
d ¤ (SAP Entitlementht) +
e ¤ (SAP Entitlementht) £ (SAP Takeupht) +
f ¤ (Federal State SAP Takeupst) +
g ¤ (Federal State Unemployment Ratest) +
"it
(1)
where Xit is a vector of usual time-varying control variables (unemployment dummy,
out-of-labour force dummy, married dummy, impact dummies for separation, di-
vorce, spouse dying and child being born last year), degree of physical disability,
quadratic in age, years of education, and household composition. All income and
SAP variables are logged, equivalized (divided by the square root of the household
size), monthly and deﬂated real (in 2000 EUR) measures.
Coeﬃcient (c) refers to the household speciﬁc real log net income. The coeﬃcient (d)
refers to the administrative value entitlement for SAP, given the household structure,
the year and federal state, i.e. the potential "outside option" of how much persons
Hahn (2006) describes PanelWhiz in detail.10
in a particular household would receive if they had no other means of income10. Here
we control for the direct eﬀect of the outside option on life satisfaction, i.e. keeping
one’s own income constant, what is the eﬀect of raising SAP beneﬁts? The reader
should keep in mind that SAP entitlement level is largely out of the control of the
respondent, deﬁned by state-speciﬁc policies. The SAP recipient can only inﬂuence
it by moving to a diﬀerent federal state or by changing his own household composi-
tion (having more children). Coeﬃcient (e) refers to the interaction of the outside
option SAP entitlement with actually having received some amount of SAP. This
can be interpreted as previously described, but this time conditioning on actually
having received the beneﬁts.
Coeﬃcient (f) refers to the share of SAP recipients by population for the year and
federal state in which a person lives. As the share of SAP recipients increases in the
federal state that a person lives in, does this eﬀect directly the life satisfaction of
the individual? We expect (c) to be positive and signiﬁcant, as in Frijters, Haisken-
DeNew, and Shields (2004a,b). As we control for income (c) directly, we expect (d)
to be negative as this eﬀectively increases the relative incomes of others compared
to the individual. The sign of coeﬃcient (e) is an empirical question and so cannot
a priori be signed. Coeﬃcient (f) should be negative as an increasing share of SAP
recipients locally keeping one’s own income constant implies a degrading of the so-
cial fabric and thus reduces life satisfaction. Additionally, we control for the state
unemployment rate (g) and expect it to be correlated with the state share of welfare
recipients.
In a second model, we control additionally for a non-stigmatizing transfer, namely
child beneﬁts (Kindergeld) with coeﬃcient (h). If SAP transfers are indeed especially
stigmatizing, then SAP should remain negative and signiﬁcant, while the coeﬃcient
on child beneﬁts should be at least zero/insigniﬁcant or positive and signiﬁcant,
given that all indications suggest the "social acceptability" of child beneﬁts. We
calculate the household-speciﬁc child beneﬁt, taking into account ages and number
10Actually there are other additional beneﬁts, such as housing beneﬁts (Wohngeld), heating
beneﬁts etc, however these are always separate from social assistance and very diﬃcult to assess
administratively.11
of the children, own income of the children and region.
LSit = a0 + ai +
[all explanatory variables from (1)] +
h ¤ (Child Beneﬁt Entitlementht) +
"it
(2)
The SOEP asks respondents of SAP receipt for two time periods: case (I) since 1995
in the current interview month about the current interview month in the household
questionnaire and case (II) since 1984 in the current interview month about the pre-
vious completed calendar year, i.e. the so-called "income calendar". Thus there are
two distinct sources of information, which may not be directly compatible with each
other in a given year. The household composition may obviously change from one
year to the next, changing the administrative possibilities of receiving SAP. Further,
there may be some additional recall error in (II), as the information is asked in the
current year about the previous year. Thus recall error is expected to be much less
in (I) as it is asked of the month previous to the interview.
Table 1: Dealing with the Time Dimension of Income and SAP Receipt in the
SOEP
Variables Case (I) Case (II)
Dependent Variable t [asked in t] t [asked in t]
Standard Explanatory Variables t [asked in t] t [asked in t]
(c) HH Net Income t [asked in t] t-1 [asked in t
(d) SAP Entitlement generated for t generated for t
(e) TakeUp x SAP Entitlement t [asked in t] t-1 [asked in t]
(f ) State SAP Take-Up t t
(g) State Unemployment Rate t t
(g) State Unemployment Rate t t
(h) Child Beneﬁt Entitlement generated for t generated for t12
The dependent variable and all standard explanatory variables are available in time
t. In addition, information about the current time t (case I) includes whether the
household receives SAP in that particular month and also the monthly net household
income answered for the entire household only by the household head. Information
collected at time t but concerning the time period t-1 (case II) includes real house-
hold net income (derived from all individual income sources, and at times, imputed)
and similarly an income source derived from SAP receipt which is coded as a 0-1
dummy. This implies running the regression (1) and (2) with all information in time
t except for the variables associated with the coeﬃcients c and e which are at time
t-1. This introduces an obvious error for which there is no obvious easy correction.
Table 1 summarizes the information sources, displaying the time period for which
the information corresponds and the year in which it was actually collected. To be
clear, the variables for household income and SAP take up are completely diﬀerent
measurement concepts from case (I) to case (II).
Again, to test the stability of the results, we present results for the years from a linear
ﬁxed eﬀects regression (FEP) model treating the dependent variable as continuous
and a non-linear conditional binary logit (FECL) with individual thresholds/ﬁxed
eﬀects. Due to the structural change in January 2005 to move the new system of
"Arbeitslosengeld II" or "Hartz IV", and the fact that the SAP recipients system-
atically after this point are diﬀerent, we limit our analysis to 1995-2004, the time
period in which we have full information for cases (I) and (II). Tables 2a-d show
descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis.
Model (1), Case (I) – Most recent income and SAP takeup information
In Table 3, we examine case (I) for the years 1995-2004. All of the standard ex-
planatory variables have the expected sign, magnitude and signiﬁcance. Looking
ﬁrst at the estimation using ﬁxed-eﬀects panel (FEP) seen in column 1 (all avail-
able households), we see that the log monthly income coeﬃcient (c) is positive and
signiﬁcant. However, the log SAP entitlement coeﬃcient (d) is about half as large,
but having the opposite sign (-0.218 for SAP as compared to 0.399 for income). We
can interpret c=0.399 as the eﬀect of a log point (quite large) increase in income13
on life satisfaction. For a log point increase in the SAP entitlement, regardless of
whether the households receive SAP, we see life satisfaction being reduced by 0.218
life satisfaction points. All households actually receive their net income, however
only a tiny fraction (roughly 3% of persons by 2004) actually receives the SAP en-
titlement, indicating substantial negative social jealousy eﬀects. We interpret the
coeﬃcient (d) as, given that one’s own income remains constant, what is the eﬀect
of increasing the SAP entitlement?
We test further to examine the potential added sensitivity of actually receiving SAP,
namely coeﬃcient (e). Given that one’s own income remains constant and that one
actually receives SAP, what is the eﬀect on life satisfaction of an increase in SAP?
This is signiﬁcantly negative at -0.025. Thus SAP delivers clear negative life satisfac-
tion impacts in general (recipients and non-recipients), however SAP recipients are
even more adversely aﬀected by increases in SAP, given that their income remains
constant, indicating an even higher level of social jealousy and/or stigma for SAP
recipients. We control also for the share of SAP recipients in the federal state and
the state unemployment rate in which the person currently lives. We see the eﬀect of
increasing the unemployment rate by one percentage point to be 0.020 points lower
on the life satisfaction scale. The share of SAP recipients is itself not signiﬁcant.
We compare the coeﬃcients (c),(d) and (e) for interpretation. If a person’s income
increases (substantially) one log point, he gains 0.399 additional units of life satis-
faction. In a more intuitive manner, the income elasticity (a 1% increase in income
produces a certain % increase in life satisfaction) is deﬁned by [(dY=dX)¤(X=Y )] =
(c=YMean) = (0:399=6:92) = 0:0584: Thus a 1% increase in income produces a
0.0584% increase in life satisfaction. Comparatively, if the SAP entitlement in-
creases by 1%, the elasticity here is -0.028 (if the person does not actually take up
SAP) and -0.032 (if the person indeed takes up SAP). The diﬀerence between these
two elasticities is the eﬀect of the take-up interaction term (e).
Assume that we increase SAP payments in general. For those who actually take
up, the increase shows up as increased income (c) as well as an increased SAP
entitlement in general (d) and actually taking up (e). The empirical question is14
simply, is the linear combination of (c), (d), and (e) equal to zero? If it is zero,
then increasing SAP payments would have the positive eﬀect of increasing actual
income, but have the oﬀsetting negative eﬀect of stigma. Indeed by zero, these two
eﬀects would cancel each other. We perform an F-Test to see whether this is true.
The linear combination of (c), (d), and (e) is indeed greater than zero, and the null
hypothesis is clearly rejected at the 0.003 level. Clearly there is a net positive eﬀect
of providing additional SAP payments to the recipients. However this eﬀect is not
simply 100% of the c eﬀect, but indeed substantially lower. We interpret this eﬀect
as the negative externality of stigma or shame.
Alternatively, we can increase SAP payments, and for the vast majority of persons
who do not take up, this has the immediate negative impact on life satisfaction of
-0.218, the coeﬃcient (d). The corresponding elasticity of (d) is simply (-0.218 /
6.92) = -0.028. Thus a general 1% increase in SAP payments for other people (but
not the respondent himself), reduces non-takers’ life satisfaction by 0.028%. Again,
we interpret this eﬀect as "social jealousy", as the persons not receiving the extra
SAP payments observe that others do, and this degrades their own relative income
position, causing the negative eﬀect on life satisfaction. This eﬀect does not appear
to be very large; however the absolute size is more than 50% (0.028/0.058) of the
positive eﬀect of increasing income by the same amount. Coeﬃcients (c) and (d)
are statistically diﬀerent from each other, even using 2 full standard deviations for
the conﬁdence interval.
Next we examine for case (I) the same model speciﬁcation using the conditional
(binary) logit estimator with person-speciﬁc ﬁxed-eﬀects (FECL). We ﬁnd very sim-
ilar results, with all focus variables having similar magnitudes, identical signs and
almost identical standard errors. We lose some observations as compared to the
FEP, as the FECL estimator removes all observations in which the dependent does
not vary (i.e. all persons in which they have never deviated from the person-speciﬁc
mean).
Because FECL is a non-linear model, we use a non-linear combination11 of (c), (d)
11In Stata, this command is nlcom, which is equivalent to the "Delta" method.15
and (e) and test whether the sum of these coeﬃcients equals zero. For takers and
non-takers, the combination is positive and signiﬁcant (t-value = 2.3 and 2.0 re-
spectively). Thus even in the FECL model, increasing SAP (and also income at the
same time) has a net positive eﬀect on life satisfaction, but not 100% the level of
the direct income eﬀect (compare 0.542 for just income with 0.542 - 0.218 - 0.025 =
0.206 on take up).
Model (1), Case (II) – Imputed income and SAP takeup information
from t-1
Here we use the income and SAP take up information from the time t-1 covering
the same time period as in case (I), namely 1995-2004. Further the total income
measure is derived from imputed components of income, from persons who may or
may not still be in the household in time t. It is not clear whether the income
measures in case (II) are better or worse than case (I), but there are some direct
implications for this analysis. We examine now column 3 of Table 3 using linear
FEP. The coeﬃcient (c) in income is now substantially smaller at 0.177 (than in
column 1) but still highly signiﬁcant. The linear combination of (c), (d) and (e)
can however no longer be diﬀerentiated from zero and the null hypothesis cannot
be rejected. This implies, that although there is a positive elasticity of income on
life satisfaction of (0.177 / 6.92) = 0.0263, the linear combination of (d) and (e)
at (-0.163 - 0.020) / 6.92 = -0.0264 completely oﬀsets this, producing a zero net
eﬀect (taking into account standard errors of the coeﬃcients). Thus by using this
measure of income and SAP receipt, the stigma eﬀect is 100%! To explain this idea,
we increase SAP. For those takers, this increases their income by the same amount
that SAP entitlement increases. However, as seen by the coeﬃcients in column 3,
the positive eﬀect of (c) is completely oﬀset by the sum of the negative eﬀects of
(d) and (e). For those non takers, there is a social jealousy eﬀect of (d).
Using data from case (II), only when own earned income increases over and above
the subsistence level as provided by the SAP, does a person experience an increase
in life satisfaction. This has serious policy implications, as it makes it clear that16
the general European policy of smoothing income by providing assistance or beneﬁt
payments as opposed to the general Anglo-Saxon method of creating strong incen-
tives for re-entry into the labor market by such schemes as the American Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) etc, has dire negative externalities, that have otherwise
been overlooked. Simply increasing SAP for takers leaves their life satisfaction com-
pletely unchanged, due to oﬀsetting stigma or shame eﬀects. The situation is even
more critical for non-takers. Their relative income position is eroded compared to
those receiving SAP and receive a strong negative eﬀect, which we interpret as social
jealousy. For the non takers, the social jealousy eﬀect is so large, that it is eﬀectively
as if the additional SAP amount were taken from their income, euro for euro.
Examining column 4 of Table 3, we compare the coeﬃcients for case (II) using the
FECL estimation method. Here we see a very similar picture to that of the linear
FEP results. The positive coeﬃcient (c) is completely oﬀset by the negative eﬀects
of coeﬃcients (d) and (e). A non-linear combination of the coeﬃcients is not sta-
tistically diﬀerent from zero, regardless of whether one takes up.
One explanation for the much smaller income eﬀects using these income indicators
in case (II) may be the time dimension. It could be that the income from the pre-
vious year has a much smaller (but not zero) eﬀect as compared to income from
the current time period income. However the negative eﬀects of the SAP receipt
interaction are almost identical, comparing columns 1 through 4 for coeﬃcient (e).
Model (2) Controlling for non-stigmatizing transfers, Child Beneﬁts
A potential criticism of the method used is that the SAP Entitlement may be captur-
ing other phenomena than what we originally had intended. We expand our analysis
to Model 2, in which we additionally control for child beneﬁts (Kindergeld). In a
similar manner, we control for log equivalized real child beneﬁt transfers in addition
to the SAP transfers. As such, for these controls, we lose about half of the sample,
as we can only include observations in which some child beneﬁt is actually paid (due
to the log form of the variable as is standard in the literature). Thus necessarily we17
have only households in which at least one child is present and would receive ben-
eﬁts (some "adult" children themselves earn a suﬃciently high amount that child
beneﬁts are no longer paid to their parents). We then are forced to remove one
variable in a dummy set controlling for number of children in the household to make
the (omitted) reference category "one child in household".
At no time would we expect the coeﬃcient (h) to be signiﬁcantly negative, as there
have been no previous indications that child beneﬁts are received with any amount
of stigma or social jealousy. On the contrary, we see that coeﬃcient (h) in column
5 (Case I) is positive and signiﬁcant at 0.142, whilst the coeﬃcient for income (c)
has increased slightly to 0.497 and the SAP coeﬃcient (d) has remained relatively
stable at -0.343. The linear combination of (c) and (d), or (c), (d) and (e) can
no longer be diﬀerentiated from zero. In column 6, we ﬁnd almost identical results
using the FECL model such that the linear combination of (c) and (d), or (c),
(d) and (e) cannot be diﬀerentiated from zero. For Case II in columns 7 and 8,
we see almost identical results to that of Case I (columns 5 and 6). We conclude
that increasing SAP payments simply increases stigma and social jealousy negative
externalities to the exact same extent that a person experiences positive utility
from additional income. The two equal and opposite eﬀects eﬀectively cancel each
other out. As such, only own-earned income, over and above the SAP level adds
a positive contribution to life satisfaction. On the contrary, child beneﬁt payments
are clearly welcomed by recipients (no stigma), adding utility beneﬁts in terms of
life satisfaction over and above a pure income eﬀect.
4 Conclusions
Over the past 25 years, Germany has more than doubled the share of social as-
sistance recipients, currently at some 3.5% on average. Although this share is not
particularly large, it has constantly been the subject of public concern. The city
states of Bremen, Berlin and Hamburg have had traditionally high levels, even as
much as 10% over this period. During this time there have been several exogenous
reforms in beneﬁt levels for SAP. This paper calculates the counterfactual admin-
istrative amount that a household would receive if it were a SAP recipient without18
any outside resources. The level of beneﬁts varies not only predominantly by chang-
ing deﬁnitions of household composition, but also by federal state and year and is
largely exogenous to the household.
This paper analyzed the eﬀect of SAP levels on personal life satisfaction, using two
diﬀerent concepts of household net income and SAP take up within the German
SOEP. Keeping one’s own income constant, increases in the SAP Entitlement re-
duce signiﬁcantly life satisfaction. In fact, the absolute level of the negative eﬀect
of SAP (whether one receives it or not) is around 50%-100% of the positive eﬀect of
one’s own income. We call this phenomenon "social jealousy". For those actually
receiving SAP, their levels of "stigma" or "shame" are signiﬁcantly even higher and
are aﬀected even more negatively by increases in SAP. Thus the potential monetary
welfare gain to those receiving SAP must in some way be discounted by the sub-
stantial loss due to social jealousy experienced by SAP recipient and non-recipients
alike. Clearly it is in the best interest of policy makers to reduce welfare leakage
due to negative externalities like social jealousy and stigma.
We tested the stability of the SAP transfer results by examining another largely
used program, namely child beneﬁts (Kindergeld). Here we see that the results
for the SAP if anything are strengthened by the additional control variable. SAP
transfers are seen to be decreasing life satisfaction in the form of social jealousy and
stigma, whereas child beneﬁts exhibit clear positive externalities over and above a
pure income eﬀect, just as one would expect from a stigma-free social program.
These ﬁndings have large implications for social policy, as clearly the focus of Ger-
man social policy should be towards increasing employability, (re-)integrating or
(re-)introducing adults to employment, such that they are able to provide more
for themselves. Programs such as the EITC in the Unites States, which provide
beneﬁts only for those who work, are a step in the right direction. The reliance
on SAP has clear negative externalities for those who receive it (in the form of
"stigma") and those who ﬁnance it (in the form of "social jealousy"). Depending on
the model used, only income earned over and above the subsistence level actually
increases life satisfaction. This would imply that simply relying on policies geared19
toward marginal employment, producing subsistence level incomes provide little or
no welfare enhancement as measured by life satisfaction. While this study makes no
speciﬁc recommendation for a "correct" or "optimal" minimum existence, it does
shed light on the dramatic negative externalities of social policy, borne by recipients
and non-recipients alike, which must be taken into consideration when examining
the "true costs" for such a policy.20
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Figure 2: Average Potential Household SAP Entitlement: Variation by State and
Time24
Tabel 2a: Model (1), Case (I): Descriptive Statistics (N=117878)
Variable mean sd min max
Satisfaction With Life At Today 6.9188 1.7401 0 10
Unemployed 0.0778 0.2678 0 1
Out of Labor Force (OLF) 0.1713 0.3768 0 1
Married 0.7037 0.4566 0 1
Shock: Separated 0.0160 0.1254 0 1
Shock: Divorced 0.0055 0.0741 0 1
Shock: Spouse Died 0.0021 0.0461 0 1
Shock: Child born 0.0383 0.1918 0 1
Work Disability 0.0410 0.1984 0 1
Age 41.8485 12.2668 20 64
Age Squared / 10 109.1769 104.9364 40 409.6
Years of Education 11.8949 2.5883 7 18
Number of Children in HH: 1 0.2390 0.4265 0 1
Number of Children in HH: 2 0.2000 0.4000 0 1
Number of Children in HH: 3+ 0.0764 0.2657 0 1
Log Equivalized Real HH Net Income 7.1922 0.4681 1.648 11.11
Log Equivalized Real SAP Entitlement 5.9625 0.1776 4.898 6.633
Takeup x L-E-R SAP Entitlement 0.1134 0.8166 0 6.512
Share of Welfare Recipients 3.2195 1.4080 1.4 10.6
State Speciﬁc Unemployment Rate 12.1287 4.7674 5.493 22.1225
Tabel 2b: Model (1), Case (II): Descriptive Statistics (N=126794)
Variable mean sd min max
Satisfaction With Life At Today 6.9224 1.7466 0 10
Unemployed 0.0771 0.2667 0 1
Out of Labor Force (OLF) 0.1710 0.3765 0 1
Married 0.7060 0.4556 0 1
Shock: Separated 0.0159 0.1253 0 1
Shock: Divorced 0.0055 0.0738 0 1
Shock: Spouse Died 0.0022 0.0464 0 1
Shock: Child born 0.0386 0.1926 0 1
Work Disability 0.0407 0.1976 0 1
Age 41.8438 12.2451 20 64
Age Squared / 10 190.0847 104.7269 40 409.6
Years of Education 11.8917 2.5818 7 18
Number of Children in HH: 1 0.2416 0.4281 0 1
Number of Children in HH: 2 0.2024 0.4018 0 1
Number of Children in HH: 3+ 0.0762 0.2653 0 1
Log Equivalized Real HH Net Income 7.3008 0.5329 0 11.56
Log Equivalized Real SAP Entitlement 5.9637 0.1778 4.898 6.633
Takeup x L-E-R SAP Entitlement 0.1310 0.8763 0 6.471
Share of Welfare Recipients 3.2122 1.4051 1.4 10.6
State Speciﬁc Unemployment Rate 12.1168 4.7495 5.493 22.1226
Tabel 2c: Model (2), Case (I): Descriptive Statistics (N=60766)
Variable Mean sd min max
Satisfaction With Life At Today 6.9751 1.6939 0 10
Unemployed 0.0693 0.2540 0 1
Out of Labor Force (OLF) 0.1298 0.3360 0 1
Married 0.7961 0.4029 0 1
Shock: Separated 0.0113 0.1056 0 1
Shock: Divorced 0.0054 0.0733 0 1
Shock: Spouse Died 0.0011 0.0337 0 1
Shock: Child born 0.0734 0.2607 0 1
Work Disability 0.0381 0.1914 0 1
Age 38.4197 9.5912 20 64
Age Squared / 10 156.8060 75.3769 40 409.6
Years of Education 11.9315 2.5884 7 18
Number of Children in HH: 2 0.3881 0.4873 0 1
Number of Children in HH: 3+ 0.1482 0.3553 0 1
Log Equivalized Real HH Net Income 7.1268 0.4335 1.648 10.31
Log Equivalized Real SAP Entitlement 6.0666 0.1295 5.189 6.633
Takeup x L-E-R SAP Entitlement 0.1607 0.9723 0 6.512
Share of Welfare Recipients 3.1842 1.3612 1.4 10.6
State Speciﬁc Unemployment Rate 12.0453 4.7440 5.493 22.12
Log Equivalized Real Child Beneﬁt 4.6131 0.4960 2.665 6.24627
Tabel 2d: Model (2), Case (II): Descriptive Statistics (N=65964)
Variable mean sd min max
Satisfaction With Life At Today 6.9760 1.7002 0 10
Unemployed 0.0682 0.2521 0 1
Out of Labor Force (OLF) 0.1298 0.3361 0 1
Married 0.7975 0.4019 0 1
Shock: Separated 0.0112 0.1054 0 1
Shock: Divorced 0.0054 0.0730 0 1
Shock: Spouse Died 0.0011 0.0337 0 1
Shock: Child born 0.0733 0.2606 0 1
Work Disability 0.0375 0.1900 0 1
Age 38.4112 9.5782 20 64
Age Squared / 10 156.7159 75.2406 40 409.6
Years of Education 11.9313 2.5789 7 18
Number of Children in HH: 2 0.3891 0.4875 0 1
Number of Children in HH: 3+ 0.1465 0.3536 0 1
Log Equivalized Real HH Net Income 7.2599 0.4845 .6293 10.16
Log Equivalized Real SAP Entitlement 6.0665 0.1293 5.189 6.633
Takeup x L-E-R SAP Entitlement 0.1828 1.0347 0 6.471
Share of Welfare Recipients 3.1710 1.3557 1.4 10.6
State Speciﬁc Unemployment Rate 12.0559 4.7287 5.493 22.12
Log Equivalized Real Child Beneﬁt 4.6003 0.5060 2.665 6.2528
Table 3: Life Satisfaction and Social Assistance Payments: 1995-2004
Model 1: All Households Model 2: Household with Child Beneﬁts
Case I Case II Case I Case II
FEP FECL FEP FECl FEP FECL FEP FECL
Unemployed -0.629** -0.758** -0.689** -0.837** -0.584** -0.721** -0.636** -0.792**
(0.026) (0.038) (0.025) (0.036) (0.039) (0.055) (0.038) (0.052)
Out of Labor Force (OLF) -0.139** -0.095** -0.147** -0.114** -0.101** -0,071 -0.114** -0.097**
(0.023) (0.036) (0.022) (0.034) (0.032) (0.051) (0.030) (0.048)
Married 0,012 0,013 0,02 0,013 0,054 0,064 0,053 0,058
(0.030) (0.048) (0.030) (0.046) (0.051) (0.075) (0.050) (0.071)
Shock: Separated -0.406** -0.469** -0.421** -0.475** -0.433** -0.417** -0.479** -0.476**
(0.044) (0.059) (0.043) (0.057) (0.081) (0.105) (0.078) (0.099)
Shock: Divorced -0,077 -0,158 -0.135** -0.211** -0,077 -0,169 -0,125 -0,204
(0.066) (0.096) (0.065) (0.093) (0.094) (0.138) (0.091) (0.132)
Shock: Spouse Died -1.159** -1.075** -1.148** -1.067** -1.132** -1.016** -1.180** -1.026**
(0.135) (0.177) (0.129) (0.170) (0.234) (0.322) (0.226) (0.315)
Shock: Child born 0.198** 0.314** 0.177** 0.296** 0.200** 0.330** 0.184** 0.321**
(0.022) (0.039) (0.021) (0.037) (0.024) (0.043) (0.023) (0.041)
Work Disability -0.290** -0.373** -0.290** -0.376** -0.260** -0.383** -0.276** -0.391**
(0.026) (0.038) (0.025) (0.037) (0.038) (0.056) (0.036) (0.054)
Age -0.083** -0.121** -0.077** -0.115** -0.062** -0.094** -0.058** -0.098**
(0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.014) (0.015) (0.025) (0.015) (0.024)
Age Squared / 10 0.004** 0.005** 0.003** 0.004** -0,001 -0,003 -0,002 -0,002
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Years of Education 0.013* 0.021* 0.017** 0.029** 0,012 0,015 0,013 0,019
(0.007) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017)
Number Children in HH: 1 0.069** 0.097** 0,03 0.059* – – – –
(0.020) (0.035) (0.020) (0.034)
Number Children in HH: 2 0.111** 0.135** 0.052* 0.078* -0.056* -0.133** -0.090** -0.182**
(0.028) (0.048) (0.027) (0.046) (0.031) (0.053) (0.029) (0.050)
Number Children in HH: 3+ 0.123** 0.144** 0,057 0,074 -0.111** -0.235** -0.163** -0.326**
(0.043) (0.072) (0.042) (0.069) (0.055) (0.092) (0.052) (0.087)
(c) Log Equivalized Real HH Net Income 0.399** 0.539** 0.177** 0.242** 0.497** 0.678** 0.234** 0.285**
(0.020) (0.033) (0.017) (0.027) (0.031) (0.051) (0.028) (0.043)
(d) Log Equivalized Real SAP Entitlement -0.218** -0.347** -0.163** -0.309** -0.343** -0.489** -0.263** -0.355*
(0.065) (0.109) (0.065) (0.106) (0.128) (0.208) (0.126) (0.201)
(e) Takeup x L-E-R SAP Entitlement -0.025** -0.030** -0.020** -0,018 -0.028** -0.043** -0.027** -0.029**
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.010) (0.013)
(f) Share of Welfare Recipients 0,018 0.039* 0,019 0.036* 0,009 0,037 0,01 0,033
(0.014) (0.022) (0.013) (0.021) (0.024) (0.036) (0.024) (0.035)
(g) State Speciﬁc Unemployment Rate -0.020** -0.030** -0.020** -0.029** -0.022** -0.036** -0.023** -0.037**
(0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
(h) Log Equivalized Real Child Beneﬁt – – – – 0.142** 0.250** 0.157** 0.285**
(0.028) (0.049) (0.026) (0.045)
Constant 8.148** – 9.220** – 7.604** – 8.817** –
(0.444) (0.425) (0.839) (0.803)
R2/ Pseudo R2 0,037 0,023 0,032 0,02 0,039 0,027 0,034 0,024
N 117878 99614 126794 108510 60766 48769 65964 53809
*p<0.1, **p<0.05